Mozambique’s Crisis – Two Emperors, One Uncertain Future

The current unrest in Mozambique is more than just a response to electoral issues – it is a deeper movement that challenges the country’s political and social structures.

These were the words of Egídio Chaimite, a senior researcher at the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE) in Mozambique, who described the ongoing demonstrations during which hundreds of people were killed – mostly by police – as a “movement of awakening citizenship” after 25 years of poll fraud accusations.

Pivotal information as the presidential elections held on October 9, 2024, is generally seen as the catalyst of the widespread protests centered around opposition leader Venancio Mondlane, running under the banner of the Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (Podemos), who refused to concede to Daniel Chapo, the ruling Frelimo party’s candidate.

Chaimate was hosted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) along with André Mulungo, Editor and Democracy Coordinator of CDD Mozambique, and independent specialist and risk consultant Marisa Lourenço under the title of Mozambique’s Problem of Two Emperors – Exploring Domestic and Regional Impacts of Protests and Unrest Following 2024’s Elections.

‘Candidate of the people’

Opposition leader and presidential candidate Mondlane fled the country after two of his senior lawyers, Elvino Dias and Guambe, were murdered in Maputo on October 19, 2024, saying he feared for his life. He returned after two and a half months in self-imposed exile, and held a mock inauguration in which he described himself as the “candidate of the people”.

The electoral commission declared Chapo and the ruling Frelimo party victorious with over 70% of the vote while Mondlane came in second with 20%, pushing out Renamo, the historic rival of the ruling party Frelimo, which has been in power in Mozambique since it gained independence from Portugal in 1975.

Tensions continued to escalate as Mondlane called for “restoring electoral truth” and challenged Mozambicans to use the image of “the candidate they voted for” during protests.

During the webinar, moderated by Steven Grudz, head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at SAIIA, Chaimite said Mozambicans have often been seen as “a kind of passive… docile”.

” … even in the face of injustice, electoral issues, electoral fraud included …  (this time) things went higher, and people decided to shake not just the image as such, but … the foundational political structure that was long relied on that silence,” he said.

Political analyst Marisa Lourenço described the protests as “unprecedented in post-election unrest”, saying Mozambican society has been deeply dissatisfied with the status quo for years.

She referred to rising poverty, high inflation, and a weakening currency as factors that have placed immense pressure on the population. Lourenço said the ruling Frelimo party’s overwhelming victory in the election was viewed as a “blatant dismissal” of public grievances, resulting in unrest.

Doctors, teachers, nurses, and even judges declared strikes due to wages and working conditions.

André Mulungo, editor of the Bulletin of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights, said Mozambique’s protests are rooted in socio-economic frustration. “It’s a mistake to say that the cause of the protests is only about justice or the truth of the election,” he said, adding that “economic struggles, exclusion, and marginalization also played a significant role”.

He pointed out the leadership vacuum left by the late Afonso Dhlakama, the former leader of Renamo, who many citizens saw as a defender of their rights. He said that people felt orphaned by his successor’s failure to meet expectations and asked for accountability from him. “Now they don’t have Afonso Dhlakama, so they decide to do this by themselves,” said Mulungo.

He said many of the protesters are marginalized youth demanding jobs and better opportunities.

Role of the opposition

Mondlane has shown political flexibility, Lourenço said, choosing multiple opposition parties and alliances that he believes will create the most impact.

Mondlane was initially barred from contesting the parliamentary elections before they took place. This exclusion was widely seen as an unfair tactic by Frelimo to weaken his chances. Despite this setback, Mondlane still ran as a presidential candidate with the support of Podemos, which has now become the main opposition, replacing Renamo.

However, Mondlane also still faces challenges due to Frelimo’s control over state institutions.

“Now that Podemos has taken seats in parliament, there has been a little divergence from the agreement they had with Mondlane,” said Lourenço.

“Mondlane, effectively, has been the driver behind these protests, especially by drawing the international community’s attention to what’s happening in Mozambique and supporting the frustration of the population against the status quo.”

“Podemos is untested. It’s new. We have to wait and see.”

Lourenço said that Podemos’ rise as the main opposition is a major shift in Mozambican politics but cautioned that opposition parties in the region often face fragmentation and internal divisions over time. She said that Podemos’ decision to take parliamentary seats signals an acceptance of Frelimo’s victory in the parliamentary election, choosing to engage with the system from within.

“It just remains to see how much they are willing to push and also how much Frelimo is going to push back. It’s already pushed back a lot. It’s very authoritarian. I think it’s getting worse. But how that will play out in the future will be very interesting to see,” said Lourenço.

The country was historically dominated by Frelimo and Renamo, but Renamo was weakened by internal crises in recent years, said Chaimite. Mondlane, who mobilized the people for the protests, was previously part of Renamo.

“The opposition leader highlighted the problems of the system, mobilized that, and made a movement like the one we are seeing now.

“Poverty has risen from 45% to 65% in the last ten years. It’s too much. Inequality follows the same path,” said Chaimite. “Every year, about half a million young people enter the job market, but only 100,000 manage to find opportunities. That leaves 400,000 without jobs…”

Chaimite also outlined two scenarios: one where political tensions escalate into further repression and violence, and another where dialogue leads to compromise and stability. He said that if key figures like Mondlane are excluded from dialogue, protests and civil disobedience will continue, likely met with increased repression, perpetuating a cycle of violence and persecution of opposition figures. He said that recent police killings during protests are evidence of this trend.

“Leadership is key in this case,” said Chaimite. “Daniel Chapo has more responsibility, so he needs to bring everyone to the table and compromise, and that’s the only way we can move forward.”

“So now it’s time to do for us, we have to do for ourselves.”

Mulungo said the protests are driven by the frustration of the people who demand change, not just one individual.

“Even if we don’t have Mondlane, someone else will be just to lead the citizens. Here it’s not because of Mondlane, it’s because of the citizens,” said Mulungo. “Mondlane is a very important actor, but the most important thing here to understand is that the citizens are tired and they demand change.”

Mulungo said that the ruling party has captured institutions, making it impossible to challenge fraud through legal means. “Citizens feel they have nowhere to turn,” he said.

He recounted hearing threats against Mondlane’s life but reiterated that such action wouldn’t stop the movement. He also mentioned rumors of Mondlane joining a government with Chapo, which some citizens see as a betrayal of their cause.

According to Mulungo, lasting peace in the country requires a national consensus. He said that the ruling party is governing the country on its terms, warning that without a national consensus, lasting peace is unlikely. “If we don’t have a national line on the table, I don’t think that it is possible to have the peace that we desire,” he said.

He said that the first step must be dialogue, but also that “Frelimo has to understand that they have to let it go.”

“Living in a state of permanent tension, with repression by the police, is not sustainable. Even if the police control the situation, time and time again we are going to have protests -sometimes smaller, sometimes bigger, but they will be there,” said Mulungo.

Mulungo described the country as divided, with a partisan press and citizens holding opposing views on the protests.

“We have the press that I can say is on the side of the system, and we have the press that is telling the truth,” he said. This divide, he explained, mirrors the country’s political reality. “One side says what the citizens are doing is not good, while the other side insists that protests are a constitutional right,” Mulungo said. “It’s not just about the press – the whole country is divided.”

Cabo Delgado crisis and region’s role

Lourenço described the crisis in Cabo Delgado as a result of historical neglect and governance failures, while also acknowledging its partial overlap with broader dissatisfaction with the ruling party.

“Mozambique is a very big country, and all of the power is concentrated in the south, in Maputo. That’s traditionally a Frelimo stronghold. Then you’ve got the center, where Renamo has historically been more powerful. And then you get northern Mozambique, which I would describe as just effectively being stateless. This left a vacuum, which then was eventually exploited by extremists,” she said.

According to Lourenço, centuries of neglect, even after post-colonial independence and the transition to multi-party democracy, however, the efforts never managed to address issues in that part of the country, which remains one of the most underdeveloped. She said that the high socioeconomic challenges and frustration in the north allowed “bad actors” to fill the void left by the lack of state presence. She said that the overlap between the insurgency and the post-election protests stems from dissatisfaction with Frelimo’s failure to deliver socioeconomic benefits to the population in the north.

“We have pockets of instability across Mozambique.”

Mozambique has “pockets of instability,” she said. “We have a very specific problem in northern Mozambique that has calmed down, but remains ongoing and will be difficult to eradicate.”

“We saw protests in December around Afungi, where people were demonstrating against what they said was a violation of land rights,” she said. “These protests went on for about two weeks, and while they weren’t directly linked to the post-election unrest, they were spurred by it. People saw that if citizens in the cities could protest against Frelimo, maybe they could also protest against injustices they have suffered.”

“The kind of post-election protests are very much concentrated in the cities. They want to see a different parliament. They want to know that the future will be different,” Lourenço said. ” Whereas the issues in the north are very much rooted in the kind of attributes of that   part of the country.”

In contrast, Mulungo said it was very difficult to establish a relation between what’s going on in Cabo Delgado and what’s going on now in parts of the south of Mozambique, in Maputo, Inhambane, parts of Gaza, and Nampula.

He said that the crisis in Cabo Delgado had “specific problems” that set it apart. According to Mulungo, many people in the region “lost their land, lost their homes without compensation.” These localized issues, he said, made “a mistake to try to establish a relation between what’s going on in the north and what’s going on in this environment that we’re living now.”

Chaimite said that the post-electoral protests suggest that while they have distinct origins and dynamics from the Cabo Delgado insurgency, they could indirectly affect the fight against terrorism. He fears that increased focus and resources directed toward quelling the protests might divert attention and resources away from counterterrorism efforts in the north.

He also said that while the causes of the protests and terrorism are distinct, regional inequalities, particularly in the north, have worsened poverty.

Region’s role

Chaimite expressed disappointment with the role South Africa   has played during the crisis, particularly highlighting the country’s significant influence as the largest economy and military power in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. He said that South Africa, by attending a controversial presidential inauguration, gave legitimacy to a contested leader amid ongoing protests, missing an opportunity to showcase the leadership needed during such a crisis.

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He argued that, by taking a side, South Africa lost its ability to act as an effective mediator.

Chaimite also expressed disappointment with the SADC Troika   meeting, saying focus on protecting resources rather than addressing the human cost of the crisis. He felt that SADC’s lack of solidarity during the crisis marked a missed opportunity for the organization and its member states to take meaningful action.

He urged South Africa and SADC to rethink their roles and to engage in dialogue that could help resolve the crisis.

Lourenço was also disappointed with South Africa’s support of Chapo even before the Mozambican constitutional court ratified the election results and its subsequent attendance at his inauguration.

She recalled a similar situation regarding the Zimbabwean election.

“I’m always reminded of the Zimbabwean general election, which was in August 2023, when it was quite remarkable to see the SADC electoral head, who was the former vice president of Zambia, Enock Kavindele, came out and he said that the SADC electoral mission had found massive irregularities in the vote in Zimbabwe and that they had also found evidence of voter intimidation. And I think that was, you know, one of the few times that we’ve seen SADC stand up, and not just seeing governments in the region, you know, blindly supporting one another. But unfortunately, that just seemed to have been a one-off event.”

She suggested that the close ties between the ANC and Frelimo, as sister liberation movements, stopped South Africa’s ability to criticize Mozambique. She said that Mozambique’s shift away from regional politics, particularly under President Filipe Nyusi, towards closer ties with Rwanda and Uganda, which she implied are “not home to the most free and fair regimes.”

“I think because under Nyusi, we did see Mozambique become a lot more draconian,” Lourenço said. “It’s very telling that there has been that pivot, eastward and looking away from the traditional role that it plays within Southern Africa and SADC.”

Lourenço drew a parallel between South Africa’s support of Frelimo and its past support of the Zimbabwean government, suggesting a pattern of prioritizing political ties over democratic principles. She was reminded of the time when Yugoslavia was breaking up, and Germany recognized Croatia very quickly, resulting in the Bosnian wars. “Once the big fish recognize or take a political step like that, it is difficult to turn back the clock,” she said.

Mulungo identified two key obstacles to SADC intervention – a lack of legitimacy and historical relationships among former liberation movements.

He said that Cyril Ramaphosa and Emmerson Mnangagwa’s early welcome of Chapo, even before official results, undermined their credibility with the opposition, particularly Venancio Mondlane. He said that the shared history of liberation movements among SADC countries creates a sense of brotherhood and mutual protection, which can also breed mistrust, especially from Mondlane.

He said that these two factors – lack of legitimacy and historical ties – make SADC intervention challenging.

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