Africa: The Revived Luanda Process – Inching Towards Peace in East DRC?

Rwanda-DRC talks have resumed, but whether they can shift the fundamental barriers to peace remains to be seen.

The Luanda Process was established as part of the 2022 Luanda Roadmap, aimed at defusing tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and bringing peace to east DRC. However, escalated fighting from October 2023 between M23 rebels and the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) led to a stalemate.

The DRC accused the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) of fighting alongside the M23, while Rwanda claimed that the DRC supported the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – a Hutu rebel group active in east DRC.

So the process was relaunched in early 2024 under Angolan President João Lourenço’s mediation, and on 30 July a permanent ceasefire was agreed between the two countries. Several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations between the Rwandan and DRC foreign ministers tried to address the underlying causes of the recurrent conflict. But the meeting between the two countries’ intelligence service heads in Rubavu, Rwanda, on 29 and 30 August was productive.

The Rubavu agreement revolves around three main points: neutralising the FDLR, withdrawing Rwandan forces from the DRC, and possibly involving Rwanda’s forces in the military operation against the FDLR. The last point relates to an ad hoc mechanism set up in the 2022 process to verify the agreement’s implementation. It will include three Rwandan, three Congolese and 18 Angolan military officers, and will be led by Angolan Lieutenant-General João Nassone.

Some disagreements remain on how to implement the Rubavu agreement, as the DRC insists that the neutralisation of the FDLR accompanies the withdrawal of Rwandan forces. However the Angolan mediators are working on a detailed operational plan to resolve the DRC and Rwandan governments’ concerns.

Despite these operational aspects, successfully implementing the Rubavu agreement will depend on resolving several major political and security challenges.

In its goal to dismantle the FDLR, the Luanda Process mirrors past approaches that failed to deliver long-term peace. In fact, the DRC’s armed forces have previously launched military operations to neutralise the FDLR, alone or jointly with the RDF.

As far back as January 2009, the DRC army and 5 000 RDF soldiers launched a 35-day joint military operation against the FDLR. However, a month after its completion, the FDLR – dispersed and dislocated due to the operation – regained their former positions while launching retaliatory attacks against civilians who allegedly collaborated with the RDF.

Between May 2009 and January 2015, three more military operations by the DRC army and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC failed to dismantle the group.

One of the main reasons for these failures is the vastness of DRC territory, mostly covered in forest, giving the FDLR cover when military operations start. More importantly, the DRC army lacks the tactical, operational and logistical capabilities in asymmetric warfare and cannot properly hold positions abandoned by the FDLR.

That means the likelihood of the DRC armed forces defeating the FDLR as part of the Luanda Process is limited. This is especially true because most Congolese question Rwanda’s agenda in the DRC and reject the RDF’s possible role in an operation against the FDLR.

The disengagement of Rwandan forces is also problematic because it doesn’t deal with the M23 rebel movement. The Congolese government considers the M23 a Rwandan proxy, and so requires that Rwandan forces and M23 withdraw simultaneously.

However, Kigali sees the M23 – and its Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) ally – as Congolese rebels advocating separate grievances. The M23 has articulated demands beyond the FDLR issue, such as the return of refugees, citizenship, access to land, control of natural resources and, above all, the lack of government authority in east DRC. The Angolan mediators recently proposed direct negotiations between the DRC government and M23, which Kinshasa rejected.

The DRC government’s mobilisation of local Mai Mai armed groups under the umbrella of the Wazalendo or Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie – as part of its ongoing war against the M23 – is another challenge to the Luanda Process.

Several of these armed groups are closely associated with the FDLR, and their leaders share common business interests and community bonds with the Rwandan Hutu rebels. Wazalendo is a loose, hard-to-control entity, whose fighters battle with M23/AFC rebels in several parts of Rutshuru and Masisi, despite the 30 July ceasefire.

Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters

Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox

Success!

Almost finished…

We need to confirm your email address.

To complete the process, please follow the instructions in the email we just sent you.

Error!

There was a problem processing your submission. Please try again later.

To overcome these obstacles, regional and international bodies must assess the challenges that prevented various military and civilian initiatives undertaken to date from bearing fruit. More constructive avenues can then be found to stabilise eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region.

The Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC – SAMIDRC – which is currently being deployed, could be reconfigured and bolstered by armed forces from other countries in the region. It could have a new mandate centred on neutralising the FDLR and the cantonment of M23.

The DRC government should be urged to negotiate a ceasefire with the M23 and AFC, as already advised by the Angolan mediation. This would allow for a national political process that tackles the deep-rooted causes of the conflicts – in line with the African Union’s 2013 framework agreement.

Philippe Asanzi, Research Consultant, ISS

Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Central Africa and Lake Chad Basin, ISS

ADVERTISEMENT