Africa: Military Muscle Rather Than Mediation Prevails in DRC

Despite a growing military coalition, President Tshisekedi is failing to subdue the M23 rebels in his country’s east.

A burgeoning coalition of diverse military forces has been unable to prevent the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from taking a beating in the east of the country, where M23 rebels are receiving strong support from Rwanda.

A recent United Nations (UN) Group of Experts report said some 3 000 to 4 000 Rwandan soldiers fought alongside the M23 in DRC and that Kigali had ‘de facto control’ of the group. It also said Uganda had supported the M23. Both Rwanda and Uganda deny the allegations.

Four years into the latest chapter of the war, multiple forces have retreated as the M23 rebels make territorial gains in North Kivu province. These forces include the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC’s (MONUSCO) Force Intervention Brigade and more recently the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). They also include Wazalendo (a coalition of local militias), Kinshasa-hired Eastern European mercenaries, Burundian troops and militias of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.

This week Bintou Keita, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for DRC and head of MONUSCO, briefed the UN Security Council about her grave concern over M23’s rapid growth. She said that in the last two weeks, it had captured strategic locations in North Kivu, including Kanyabayonga town in the Lubero and Rutshuru territories, and was pushing towards South Kivu.

Keita warned that the ‘rapidly escalating M23 crisis carries the very real risk of provoking a wider regional conflict.’ She noted that ‘The escalating violence in the east continues to trigger massive population displacements, exacerbating an already dreadful humanitarian situation.’ About 7.3 million people in the country were already displaced – most in the east, she said.

SAMIDRC in particular was meant to restore hope in the eastern DRC, but the mission is under equipped and has so far not lived up to expectations. It has taken heavy casualties since its arrival in batches from 15 December, largely from mortars lobbed by M23 (likely also Rwanda) from the hills into its camps in the Sake area north-west of Goma, North Kivu’s capital.

Eight South African and three Tanzanian soldiers have died in combat since February, with many more injured. SAMIDRC is meant to reach its full complement of some 4 800 troops later this month.

The South African National Defence Union complained after the most recent M23 attack in which two captains were killed that it was ‘unacceptable’ that one apparently died because medical evacuation had taken so long. Crucially, the mission lacks helicopters, not only for medevac but also to provide air support to attack the M23.

SADC leaders agreed to the SAMIDRC mission last year at the request of DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, who wanted to counter Rwandan troops and defeat M23 once and for all. But Stephanie Wolters, a DRC expert and SA Institute of International Affairs Senior Researcher, questioned the wisdom of the mission.

In particular, it had resulted in South Africa withdrawing its forces from northern Mozambique where they were fighting insurgents, because it didn’t have the resources to fight in both theatres. Wolters also criticised the relative neglect of a political solution to the conflict with the M23.

The other critical question about SAMIDRC is finances. So far Kinshasa and Pretoria have apparently been bearing the brunt of the costs, though they clearly would like the UN to take over.

MONUSCO has already begun withdrawing from the DRC and is scheduled to be fully out by year-end. SADC would like to take over as many of its facilities as possible. In November 2023, SADC wrote to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, formally requesting UN support for SAMIDRC, including facilities, equipment, air asset services, medical support and intelligence sharing. In March, the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the deployment of SAMIDRC and the appeal for UN support.

The Secretary-General submitted a report on 28 June proposing several options for MONUSCO support to SAMIDRC. These ranged from intelligence sharing and coordination between the two missions to much more comprehensive UN support. This included troop deployment and rotation through strategic airlift, dedicated evacuation capacity and medical support, consumables, capabilities for managing environmental impact, and infrastructure maintenance contracts. These proposals were discussed at this week’s UN Security Council meeting, but it isn’t clear whether any decision was reached.

The United States (US), for one, seems reluctant to endorse anything like a rehatting of MONUSCO into SAMIDRC, as its ambassador to the UN warned against MONUSCO’s premature exit. She noted that after MONUSCO completed its drawdown from South Kivu in June, the DRC’s armed forces struggled to maintain the positions occupied by the blue hats. She said the Security Council should not support MONUSCO’s departure from the (much more volatile) North Kivu and Ituri provinces until they were more stable.

She was also sharply critical of Kigali, saying, ‘Rwanda’s military interventions and operations in North Kivu have extended beyond mere support for M23 operations to direct and decisive involvement.’ She supported SAMIDRC and welcomed the temporary humanitarian truce from 5 to 19 July, apparently largely brokered by the US. There have been no visible signs, however, that the ceasefire could lead to something more permanent.

This week, SADC’s security organ meets in Zambia to discuss SAMIDRC’s performance. Neither the Nairobi nor Luanda peace processes seem to be making much progress. The former should probably be given a formal death certificate. The latter, theoretically still revivable, calls for Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame to meet in person to resolve the issues underlying the conflict.

But neither leader is showing any signs of wanting to hold that meeting. On the contrary, the focus on strengthening their military muscles in eastern DRC shows, tragically, that both still believe they can prevail by force.

Peter Fabricius, Consultant, ISS Pretoria